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initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While most ten-year anniversary gifts
involve aluminum, tin, or diamonds, the greatest gift U.S. policymakers can present
American citizens is a reconsideration of the logic that guides America's counterterrorism
strategy. Although the United States has successfully averted large-scale domestic terrorist
attacks, its inability to grasp the nature of the enemy has cost it dearly in wasted resources
and, more importantly, lost lives. Two of the most consistent and glaring policy flaws
revolve around the concepts of filling "ungoverned spaces" and installing democracy by
force.
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Abstract
October 7, 2011, marked a decade since the United States invaded Afghanistan and initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While most
ten-year anniversary gifts involve aluminum, tin, or diamonds, the greatest gift U.S. policymakers can present American citizens is a reconsideration of the logic that guides America's counterterrorism strategy.
Although the United States has successfully averted large-scale domestic
terrorist attacks, its inability to grasp the nature of the enemy has cost it
dearly in wasted resources and, more importantly, lost lives. Two of the
most consistent and glaring policy flaws revolve around the concepts of
filling "ungoverned spaces" and installing democracy by force.

Introduction
Since the publication of the 2004 National Military Strategy, ungoverned spaces and democratization of ill-governed areas have served as the
linchpins of America's counterterrorism strategy. Many policymakers and
national security professionals accept as gospel the untested and even
illogical ungoverned spaces/ill-governed areas concepts.1 To rationalize
military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Libya, U.S. policymakers have asserted that ungoverned spaces and ill-governed areas serve as
terrorist safe havens that pose a significant threat to America's interests.
We contend that these concepts of ungoverned spaces and ill-governed
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areas are dangerous red herrings that do not serve U.S. interests, and the
continued pursuit of which will only deplete resources, anger foreign populations, blemish America's reputation, and make the country less secure.
The purpose of this article is to reflect on the terrorist threat, elements of
the strategy developed to respond to it, and implementation of the strategy worldwide. Although this article is not intended to serve as an exhaustive history of the past ten years, it will consider some of America's more
significant actions abroad and their effectiveness. While we're critical of
the country's counterterrorism policy in general, we believe certain
aspects of its counterterrorism policy have been effective. The increased
cooperation among federal and state agencies and local governments has
been a welcome change. The achievements of America's intelligence community and special operations forces have been extremely impressive, as
have the performance and dedication of U.S. service members. Despite
these accomplishments and the exceptional performance of numerous
dedicated professionals, we believe the country's strategic approach overseas is not only ill-conceived, but incapable of accomplishing its policy
objectives. The impotence of American counterterrorism strategy is not
due to the performance of those on the ground called on to implement it;
rather, it is attributable to policymakers' failure to understand the enemy
and accept the repercussions of U.S. actions or the limits of the country's
power. Most policymakers seem unable to understand why other nations
do not accept "American exceptionalism," or how some of them might
view U.S. actions as imperialistic. They then choose actions or use rhetoric that are not in the country's interests—in fact, are counterproductive to
its counterterrorism mission.

Who Are We Fighting?
Perhaps the most destructive handicap with which the West has had to
contend since the beginning of the War on Terrorism is its inability to
understand whom it needs to fight. Westerners in general and Americans
in particular do not distinguish between Salafist Wahhabists and Salafist
jihadist al-Qaida. In her book Living History, then Democratic senator
and presidential hopeful Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote:
"Wahhabism troubles me because it is a fast-spreading form of
Islamic fundamentalism that excludes women from full participation in their societies, promotes religious intolerance and, in its
most extreme version, as we learned with Usama bin Laden,
advocates terror and violence."2
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Nor do many prominent Americans distinguish between the political
Salafist Muslim Brotherhood, the Shia Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), and the Salafist jihadist al-Qaida. For instance, former
Republican senator and presidential hopeful Rick Santorum told a radio
audience that the Muslim Brotherhood was "as dangerous to Western civilization and the future of our country" as al-Qaida. He added that, while
the Brotherhood didn't use violence in Egypt, "that doesn't mean that they
aren't for all of the things that violent jihadists are for."3
It might surprise Americans to learn that the only people who dislike the
Muslim Brotherhood more than they do is al-Qaida. Wahhabis differ from
al-Qaida in two important respects. First, Wahhabism supports the sovereignty of the Saudi king, a regime that al-Qaida considers illegitimate.
Second, theologically, Wahhabists contested Usama bin Laden's authority
to declare jihad, believing that it is reserved to legitimate sovereigns.
When Wahhabist clerics condemned al-Qaida's September 11, 2001
attacks, Usama bin Laden retaliated by denouncing them as corrupt puppets of the illegitimate Saudi king.4 Likewise, al-Qaida condemns the
Muslim Brotherhood for foregoing jihad and instead turning to civil political processes. Then al-Qaida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri
admonished the Muslim Brothers for "luring thousands of young Muslim
men into lines for elections...instead of into the line of jihad."5
The Western failure to distinguish Salafist jihadism from its less dangerous predecessors has caused the United States to establish an unacceptably high bar for winning the War on Terrorism. Setting aside America's
misguided insistence on engaging in interstate war to stop international
terrorism, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the United States and her allies
have, simply put, picked unnecessary fights. In Iraq, besides the unavoidable fights with Ba'athists and al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), coalition forces
engaged in a long, destructive battle with the Iranian-style Shia political
Salafist party, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, and its armed wing, Jaysh alMahdi. Our insistence on marginalizing Sadr has increased his stature in
Iraq and given ammunition to conservative elements inside Iran who use
U.S. aggression against Shia Iraqis to bolster their own domestic support.
The Taliban's entrenched support in Pashtun Afghanistan, combined with
the Karzai government's weakness in large swaths of the same region, has
hindered progress in that country as well. After its initial success in
Afghanistan, the coalition has spent a decade defending a corrupt secular
regime against a political Salafist Taliban insurgency. Persistent problems
with the Afghan justice system, including rampant corruption and a
shortage of qualified judges, have created a void that the Taliban has filled
with its own, more efficient, culturally familiar shar'ia justice system.
3
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Hamid Karzai added fuel to the persistent charges of Afghan government
corruption with his own 2009 presidential election campaign; international observers concluded that as many as a quarter of the ballots cast
were fraudulent.6 Meanwhile, our insistence on defeating a political system incapable of threatening the West has strained the U.S. relationship
with nuclear-armed Pakistan to the breaking point.
Unfortunately, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan has been almost as
effective as the Afghan government at alienating Pashtuns. Civilian casualties caused by night raids and air strikes have been a persistent irritant
throughout the war, but this problem came to a head in 2011 when, only
days after protests in Kabul prompted Hamid Karzai to publically demand
an end to all civilian casualties, NATO forces mistakenly shot Karzai's
cousin in a night raid.7 It is not hard to see why Pashtuns have begun to
perceive the war as one in which foreign aggressors are trying to supplant
indigenous, familiar, politically Salafist Taliban rule with a corrupt and
ineffective Western-backed regime. Alienating the local population in this
manner has led to discontent and increased societal elements willing to
support insurgent forces. And so coalition actions intended to decrease
safe havens might actually be increasing them, thus contradicting the policy's intent.

Counterterrorism Strategy: Filling Ungoverned
Spaces and Spreading Democracy
On December 1, 2009, President Obama reaffirmed the United States'
counterterrorism strategy during his Afghanistan War speech delivered at
the United States Military Academy. He defined Afghanistan as a "vital
national interest" in which the "security of the United States is at stake."
The president further insisted that ungoverned spaces and instability in
Afghanistan will result in attacks on the United States and its allies.8
These assertions are widely accepted and seldom questioned in the
counterterrorism strategy debate. While individuals in Afghanistan
undoubtedly played a role in planning September 11, 2001, the attacks
likely would have occurred without Afghanistan as a base of operations.
We find it difficult to believe that in the telecommunications age, a
terrorist organization would require a country like Afghanistan to plan,
organize, and execute attacks. The strength of a terrorist organization is
not its location, but its ability to promote its message to a distributed and
receptive audience. The world is a large place with many suitable
locations for terrorists to avoid the watchful eye of the United States and
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its allies. The United States does not have the resources necessary to fill
the global void, and its attempt to establish democracies in ungoverned
spaces can be counterproductive.
Beyond mere rhetoric, the concept of ungoverned spaces is a pillar of
America's strategic documents. It first appeared in the 2004 National
Military Strategy, which warned of the threat posed by ungoverned
spaces and spoke of the need to eliminate these areas. Since the publication of the 2004 National Military Strategy, ungoverned spaces have
been mentioned in the 2006 National Security Strategy, the 2008
National Defense Strategy, the 2006 Counterterrorism Strategy, and
President Obama's most recent counterterrorism strategy.9 Each of these
documents argues that ungoverned spaces are terrorist sanctuaries serving as bases of operations to attack American interests. The documents
further assert that the threat posed by the sanctuaries is so severe that
America must ensure these areas are properly governed.
In 2006, fear of ungoverned spaces led the United States to support Ethiopia when it ousted the Islamic Court Union (ICU) from power in Somalia. While Ethiopia and the United States were successful in ejecting the
ICU, the action only sank the country into further turmoil and confusion.
The ICU certainly was not an ideal administration that valued individual
rights, but it did provide a sense of stability in a country that sorely lacked
basic governmental structures.10 Now, six years after the United States
supported ICU's ouster, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former leader of the ICU, is
president of Somalia as it battles al-Shabaab, an arguably more fundamentalist Islamic group with close ties to al-Qaida.11 This same organization has served as a recruiting tool for U.S. youth within Somali-American
communities.12 In 2012, the United States faces a failed state in Somalia:
piracy threatens local trade routes off its coast; al-Qaida is further
entrenched there; and disenfranchised Somali-American youth have
found a violent purpose in life. In the end, the United States' fear of
ungoverned spaces probably caused what it dreaded most—greater turmoil and increased Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. More recently,
America's support in overthrowing an established government—though,
granted, a depraved one—in Libya helped create a governance vacuum in
which a democracy might not blossom.13 This action, along with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and rhetorical support of the Arab Spring, may contradict the United States' determination to rid the world of ungoverned
spaces since those actions are creating ungoverned spaces.

5
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Confronting the Myth of Ungoverned Spaces
While U.S. officials worry about ungoverned spaces that allow terrorists
to operate indiscriminately, in reality terrorist organizations can leverage
technology to plan, organize, and execute attacks. They do not need a
home base for these purposes. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla,
David Kilcullen highlights how terrorist organizations use technology to
recruit members and spread their message to a global population.14 Marc
Sageman's book Leaderless Jihad explains how al-Qaida's strength is not
its operational prowess or control of vast territories, but its ability to
inspire would-be terrorists and the downtrodden.15 Thus, al-Qaida does
not need to organize, plan, or execute terrorist attacks, but merely serve
as a motivator through its numerous media outlets.16 There is a certain
contradiction in the "disconnectedness" theory posed by Thomas Barnett,
a prominent and influential author whose writings have persuaded many
policymakers and national security professionals that ungoverned spaces
are a threat.17 Other authors and researchers have shown that terrorists
need a certain level of infrastructure and governance to run a transnational organization effectively.18 Terrorist organizations operating out of
remote and truly ungoverned areas would have great difficulty communicating with subordinates or anyone else.19
A second pillar of America's counterterrorism strategy is democratization
of ill-governed areas. The logic here is that democratic governments are
more responsive to citizens' needs, less belligerent toward their neighbors
and the international community, and less likely to threaten the United
States. While such notions have become axioms in America's strategic
documents, cited by many national security professionals and policymakers, substantial evidence shows they are mere conjecture if not outright
fantasy. In truth, forced democratization is risky, and a democracy's success is not inevitable. Even if successful, a democracy could pose a terrorist threat. While we do not argue for repression and would prefer
democratic governments aligned with the United States, aggressively pursuing democracy as part of a counterterrorism strategy is unproven, and
we believe often ineffective and counterproductive.

Democracy as Counterterrorism Strategy:
A Flawed Approach
The impact of democracy on political violence, particularly terrorism, is
an important topic for policy choices and implementation. The belief in
the power of democracy to solve the terrorist problem influenced past
U.S. presidential administrations and is now captured within strategy and
6
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pursued through policy. The notion is so influential that the September
2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism identified the
advancement of effective democracies as the country's "long-term
approach" to eradicating terrorism worldwide. But is the belief in democracies' ability to end terrorism justified, or are policymakers pursuing a
solution for an insolvable problem? This question is critical to better
understanding the causes of terrorism and the impact of the actions we
take in combatting it. It is especially important in considering the use of
military force to institute democracies as a counterterrorism tool.
Democracy's impact on terrorism is difficult to determine accurately
through most forms of research. In one sense, democracy provides individuals the freedom to dissent and, through the election booth, a forum
for it. The liberties associated with democracy—for example, freedom of
speech and press and the right to assembly peacefully—also provide individuals with an outlet for being heard. We might expect that this freedom
to express and resolve grievances would reduce the number of people who
resort to terrorism to achieve their objectives; but the nature of democracy and the civil liberties it guarantees enable terrorist organizations to
move undetected, thus exploiting the very principles thought to make terrorism less likely.
Robert Pape's research on why individuals resort to suicide terrorism
offers some valuable insight into the logic of America's democratization
strategy.20 He found that suicide terrorism is often used to force liberal
democracies to make "significant territorial concessions." Thus, one could
extrapolate from Pape's findings that terrorism generally will increase
when liberal democracies occupy ungoverned spaces/ill-governed areas
in order to establish democracy, since an indigenous population's natural
reaction will be to protect their home and compel invaders to leave. If this
is true, a policy seeking to occupy ungoverned/ill-governed spaces could
increase terrorism rather than eradicate it.
Mansfield and Snyder's research on "anocracies" supports this interpretation of Pape's findings. It shows that as countries transition from autocratic regimes to democracies (the authors call these transitional
governments "anocracies"), civil strife often increases because the status
quo has been disrupted. While introducing democracy and economic
development may steer one group away from terrorism, a group that has
lost status through the new order may become disenchanted and seek a
return to the old one. Because their current conditions are beneath their
expectations, these individuals believe they are being deprived of their
rightful place in society.21 As a result, they will turn to whatever tactics
allow them to push back against the newly established order. Since terror7
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ism is a tactic of the weak, they will usually embrace it to achieve political
gains or reestablish the status quo. The terrorists often will target the outside force—or its interests—that imposed democracy to compel it to withdraw. In addition, they will attack the new governing body to weaken the
dominant sect and bring about political change. Sectarian violence in Iraq
conducted by elements of the former Ba'ath Party and Sunni groups
shows how disruption of the status quo can lead to terrorist events.
Republicans and Democrats alike understand that democracy often
imposes an administration that is undesirable from their parochial perspective. The 2005 Lebanese and 2006 Palestinian elections show how
promoting democracy in foreign countries does not always yield desirable
results. While the United States supported free and open elections in Lebanon and Palestine, it had difficulty standing by its principles when many
citizens supported Iranian-backed terrorist organizations as their parties
of choice.22 Building democracies is not antithetical to terrorist organizations; witness democratic elections that empowered notorious terrorist
groups like Hizbollah and Hamas. It is counterproductive for the United
States to rhetorically promote democracy, but not accept election results.
This unwillingness to recognize the population's choice if it is distasteful
to American interests has led some to accuse the United States of imperialism, and of protecting its own interests against those of the indigenous
population. It might be reassuring to believe that individuals exercising
their rights will automatically embrace Western-style democracy and culture, but it is also dangerous and presumptuous.
The United States spent eight years and an estimated $806 billion to
bring stability and democracy to the people of Iraq.23 The cost of the Iraq
war, both in terms of blood and treasure, stands as testimony to the difficulty of introducing democracy in a foreign land whose history, culture,
and way of life differ greatly from the American experience. While the
U.S. mission in Iraq is finally over, the long-term prognosis for that country is still uncertain. If Iraq plunges back into sectarian carnage after the
United States' departure, the once highly touted strategic victories will be
recognized, belatedly, for what they were: tactical wins only.
We also question America's contention that democratic principles and
individual rights are an effective tool in controlling ungoverned spaces. As
many authors—including those of the Defense Department's own Ungoverned Areas Project—have noted, increased individual rights and protections from government tyranny can actually increase ungoverned spaces
and the threat of terrorism.24 America's twin goals of increasing democracies and gaining control over ungoverned spaces could therefore be at
odds with each other. The country's promotion of democracy and individ8
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ual rights and its fear of ungoverned spaces pose a contradiction. As globalization breaks down barriers and provides individuals with avenues of
expression outside the glaring eyes of government authorities, individuals
and organizations with malign intentions find it easier to hide in ungoverned spaces.25 As the United States counters what it sees as the root
causes of terrorism (lack of freedom and human dignity) by helping
increase freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association,
and press, it enhances the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit and
hide among the masses. Of course, no one advocates stripping individuals
of their liberties as a tactic. Yet, one must acknowledge that increased
freedoms in an open society make it more difficult to monitor and control
citizens' behavior.

Perception Is Reality
Constructivism holds that nations have contrasting perceptions and realities because of culture, history, and experience.26 These differences affect
how a country perceives the actions or intentions of other individuals and
nations. This in turn brings into question the assertion that greater freedoms throughout the Middle East will reverse the United States' poor reputation among the Arab masses. Other nations perceive U.S. actions
based on their history and culture, not on what America intends to portray. Americans tend to view their country as a white-hatted cowboy trying to right wrongs and bring justice to the downtrodden. But other
nations see U.S. history through a different set of lenses, and so have a
contrary perspective. For example, while the United States views its Cold
War actions as countering Soviet influence, countries like Iran view them
much differently.
Americans also have difficulty understanding how a people can embrace
strict Salafism rather than Western-style democracy. From the U.S. perspective, the latticework of rights (based on John Locke's "natural rights"
to life, liberty, and property) that shield the individual from government
excesses are infinitely preferable to an ideology that subordinates the
individual to a body of sometimes brutally enforced absolute laws that
dictate every facet of one's life.27 But from a constructivist perspective, it's
not difficult to see how a people with a history of arbitrary rulers, whose
only authority is their capacity to do violence, might find the absolute rule
of a divine authority very appealing. In other words, the West faces a
decidedly uphill battle in compelling Afghan Pashtuns to reject familiar,
comfortable strict Salafism and embrace what they perceive as an exotic
foreign alternative.

9
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Schizophrenic Strategy
Well-known military strategist Bernard Brodie once stated that strategic
thinking was nothing if not pragmatic, and the important question when
deciding strategy is whether an idea will work.28 Part of the pragmatism
involved in developing strategy is identifying the resources required to
achieve one's objectives and, more importantly, deciding whether the
objectives are worth the estimated costs. Allocating resources to a particular strategy is a zero-sum game, which means that allocating resources for
one option takes available resources away from other options (or further
increases the national debt). As President Eisenhower said in his farewell
address, good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually
finds imbalance and frustration.29 The United States' current financial
state, its ambitious domestic recovery plans, and its desire to establish
government-run health care—all while waging two wars—has created
imbalance and frustration. America should understand competing interests, prioritize policy options, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis to
determine the appropriate policy. All too often American grand strategy
tries to accomplish everything while sacrificing nothing. The United
States embarked on the Global War on Terrorism by dismantling two
regimes, but failed to grasp how their collapse would empower Iran, the
other declared enemy in the region.
Before the country's 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban and Iranian governments were at odds. During her November 2007 congressional testimony, Hillary Mann Leverett, then director for Iran and
Persian Gulf Affairs within the National Security Council, testified that
Iran largely cooperated with America regarding al-Qaida, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. She also stated, "Iran hoped and anticipated that tactical
cooperation with the United States would lead to a genuine opening
between our two countries."30 The American inability or unwillingness to
prioritize between the counterterrorism mission and countering Iran created strategic friction. America ignored an opportunity to leverage U.S.
and Iranian mutual interests within the region to find common ground
and bring the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to a successful close. Instead,
it placed Iran within the "axis of evil," thus alienating a country that had
mastered the use of proxies to wreak havoc and gain strategic advantage.31 For America to find common ground with Iran after 9/11 would
not have required the two countries to become full-fledged allies. The suspicion and contempt between them runs deep, and mutual interest alone
may not have alleviated the tension. However, the United States' failure to
find mutual interest with Iran has resulted in a more painful struggle that
has cost America both lives and money. The U.S. decision to wage two
wars, while simultaneously refusing to engage Iran before the resolution
10
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of the countries' nuclear disagreement, was a schizophrenic strategy that
ensured the United States would not achieve its policy objectives.

Conclusion
The United States has spent the past eleven years and over $1.2 trillion on
the Global War on Terrorism, believing it can shape the world into a democratic bastion of bliss and peacefulness through force.32 Although we
have expended large sums of blood and treasure in this pursuit, we have
failed to grasp the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reaching our objective.
America's military forces and their interagency partners have performed
superbly and done a yeoman's job in pursuit of unclear and often
unachievable policy objectives. Although these dedicated professionals
have performed well, we are afraid their achievements are ephemeral and,
sadly, not worth the financial and personal toll the country has paid. Similarly, while U.S. national security institutions have learned from this
experience, the cost has been too high.
While the United States' GWOT, including its decision to send a sizable
conventional force into Middle Eastern countries, has been less successful
than originally hoped for, the country has successfully executed other
aspects of its strategy. The increased coordination among local, state, and
federal agencies, increased resourcing of intelligence capabilities, and
improved ability to protect the homeland (demonstrated by ten years
without a terrorist attack) is a testament to the hard work and dedication
of the counterterrorism community. The United States must exploit these
successes and continue to refine its strategy to ensure continued homeland security.
It is time for the current administration to review the failures and successes of the past ten years and determine where to allocate resources for
the counterterrorism fight. This assessment must be holistic and consider
other government priorities in order to determine how to allocate its finite
resources so the nation is adequately protected. The United States cannot
hope to defeat Salafist jihadism through warfare. Fortunately, it does not
have to; all it must do is protect itself from the physical threat of Salafist
jihadism—that is, from international terrorism. Trying to do more, given
the limited resources at its disposal, will be worse than futile; it will be
counterproductive. Informed by the lessons of the past ten years, the
United States must set aside post-9/11 emotions and update its counterterrorism strategy by considering the limits of its power and by using a
more holistic approach to allocating its resources. Clearly more research
is needed in this area.
11
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